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Politicians and Diplomats 
Positions Held January  to May 
Addington, Henry. M.P. for Devizes –; Speaker of
the House of Commons –; First Lord of the
Treasury (prime minister) and chancellor of the Exche-
quer –.
Addington, John Hiley. M.P. for Wendover, Bossiney ;
Harwich . Lord of the Treasury –, –;
joint secretary to the Treasury –; joint paymaster-
general –.
Bonaparte, Joseph. French plenipotentiary at the Congress
of Amiens –.
Bonaparte, General Napoleon. First Consul of France
–.
Bragge, Charles. M.P. for Bristol. Chairman of the Ways
and Means Committee –; treasurer of the navy
–; secretary at War –.
Canning, George. M.P. for Wendover, Tralee . Joint
paymaster of the forces –.
Cavendish-Bentinck, William Henry, third duke of Port-
land . Secretary of state for home affairs –;
Lord President of the Council –.
Cornwallis, General Charles, first Marquess Cornwallis
. British plenipotentiary to the Congress of Amiens
–.
Czartoryski, Prince Adam. Russian foreign minister
–; chancellor of Russia –.
Douglas, Sylvester, first Baron Glenbervie . M.P. for
Plympton Erle –, Hastings . Paymaster general
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–; vice president of the Board of Trade –; surveyor gen-
eral of the woods and forests –.
Dundas, Henry, first Viscount Melville . M.P. for Edinburgh. Sec-
retary of state for War –; president of the Board of Con-
trol –.
Fitzherbert, Alleyne, first Baron St. Helens . Ambassador to Rus-
sia –.
Fox, Charles James. M.P. for Westminster. Leader of the Whig party
in opposition –.
Frederick, duke of York and Albany. Commander in chief of the army
–.
Grenville, William Wyndham, first Baron Grenville . Secretary of
state for foreign affairs –.
Hobart, Robert, styled Lord Hobart –. Secretary of state for
War and the colonies –.
Jenkinson, Charles, first earl of Liverpool . Chancellor of the
duchy of Lancaster –; president of the Board of Trade
–.
Jenkinson, Robert Banks, styled Lord Hawkesbury –. M.P.
for Rye. Master of the Mint –; secretary of state for for-
eign affairs –.
Jervis, Admiral John, first earl of St. Vincent . First Lord of the
Admiralty –.
Otto, Louis Guillaume. French agent in London for the exchange of
prisoners of war –; French negotiator for the Preliminary
Treaty of Peace .
Pelham, Thomas, styled Lord Pelham –. M.P. for Sussex. Sec-
retary of state for home affairs –; chancellor of the duchy of
Lancaster –.
Perceval, Spencer. M.P. for Northampton. Solicitor general –;
attorney general –.
Pitt, John, second earl of Chatham . Lord President of the Coun-
cil –; master-general of the ordnance –.
Pitt, William. M.P. for Cambridge University. First Lord of the Trea-
sury (prime minister) and chancellor of the Exchequer –.
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Rawdon-Hastings, General Francis, second earl of Moira . Lead-
ing member of the Whig party in opposition.
Scott, Sir John, first Baron Eldon. Chief justice of the Common Pleas
–; Lord Chancellor –.
Sheridan, Richard Brinsley. M.P. for Stafford. Leading member of the
Whig party in opposition –.
Starhemberg, Count Ludwig von. Austrian minister in London
–.
Stewart, Robert, Viscount Castlereagh. M.P. for County Down. Chief
secretary for Ireland –; president of the Board of Control
–.
Talleyrand-Périgord, Charles Maurice de. French foreign minister
–.
Tierney, George. M.P. for Southwark. Leading member of the Whig
party in opposition; treasurer of the navy –.
Vansittart, Nicholas. M.P. for Hastings, Old Sarum ; special
envoy to Denmark ; joint secretary to the Treasury –.
Vorontsov, Count Alexander. Chancellor of Russia –.
Vorontsov, Count Simon. Russian minister in London –;
–.
Wellesley, Richard Colley, first Marquess Wellesley . Governor-
general of India –.
Whitworth, Charles, first Baron Whitworth . Ambassador to
France –.
Windham, William. M.P. for Norwich, St. Mawes . Secretary at
War –.
Yorke, Charles Philip. M.P. for Cambridgeshire. Secretary at War
–; secretary of state for home affairs –.
Yorke, Philip, third earl of Hardwicke . Lord Lieutenant of Ire-
land –.
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Henry Addington, first Viscount Sidmouth1, was oneof the most influential men in British politics dur-
ing the first quarter of the nineteenth century. After
serving as Speaker of the House of Commons between
 and , he was prime minister for the next three
years and held a series of other cabinet offices for four-
teen of the following twenty years under four prime
ministers. During his term as prime minister he built a
following of loyal M.P.s that was larger and more cohe-
sive than that of any other politician between  and
. Addington’s rise to power was remarkable: when
the king appointed him prime minister, he had few per-
sonal supporters and no experience in cabinet office.
Nevertheless, Addington emerged as the best candidate
to lead the government because of a complex series 
of political, diplomatic, military, economic, and social
crises. His performance as prime minister—and the
activities of some of his opponents—earned him the
political following that was to be the source of his influ-
ence for the rest of his career.
Addington has wrongly been depicted as a weak and
ineffectual leader, first by his political rivals and subse-
quently by some historians who have examined his
experience as prime minister in the context of a broader
1
theme or in relation to the career of another politician.2 This book
tells Addington’s story for the first time from his point of view, in an
approach similar to recent biographies of Charles James Fox by Leslie
Mitchell and of Georgiana, duchess of Devonshire, by Amanda Fore-
man.3 Addington was actually an effective prime minister who dealt
with enormous challenges in waging war against France, negotiating
peace, restoring government finances, and managing Parliament.
This is the story of how he fared. It is an examination of the actions
he took, his reasons for taking them, and the domestic and interna-
tional implications of those actions. While the story touches on the
interests and actions of other politicians and other states, its focus is
Addington.
When Addington accepted the seals of office in , political pow-
er in Great Britain was vested in Parliament, which comprised the
king, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons. The relative
power of these three components lacked clear definition because
there were no constitutional documents delineating a division of
power. The British Constitution was essentially unwritten, leaving it
open to different interpretations based on tradition and precedent.
Everyone concurred that legislation required the approval of the king
and both houses of Parliament and that the House of Commons
must approve taxation and all other measures of financial appropria-
tion. The most contentious issue was the nomination of ministers. It
was customary for the king to appoint the prime minister and other
great officers of state. There were occasions, however, when the min-
isters he had chosen became so unpopular with M.P.s that the gov-
ernment was unable to sustain the majorities in the two houses of
Parliament necessary to requisition taxes or pass legislation. If
enough M.P.s opposed the king’s choice of ministers, they could, in
effect, force the king to change them. By the end of the eighteenth
century it was clear that, in order to govern effectively, ministers
required both the confidence of the king and the support of the hous-
es of Parliament, particularly the House of Commons.
The House of Lords was led by the great landowners but also
included members of the royal family, senior officials of the Anglican
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Church, and politicians who had obtained peerages for political rea-
sons. The great landowners exercised considerable power because of
their wealth, their social connections, and the number of tenants and
other individuals who were dependent on them. Some commanded
large loyal followings in the House of Lords and controlled the elec-
tion of many M.P.s in the House of Commons. Many were related
through marriage. Although there were no formal political parties in
the modern sense, a series of political groups coalesced around partic-
ular leaders. None of them were strong enough on their own to con-
trol a majority in the House, but if enough of them formed an
alliance, they could exert considerable control over the business of the
House.
The House of Commons comprised those elected to represent
county or borough constituencies. Most members were related to the
landed aristocracy. Many were the sons of members of the House of
Lords. The right to vote in parliamentary elections was restricted to a
fraction of the adult male population, based on wealth or other privi-
lege. Some large constituencies had a few thousand voters; members
from these consistencies could exercise political independence when
Parliament was in session. Other constituencies had fewer than fifty
electors and were effectively under the control of a peer or another
M.P. As electors had to declare their votes publicly, the great landown-
ers could control the votes of their tenants and others to ensure that
the candidates of their choice were elected. Some members of the
Commons were, in effect, leaders of their own parties, which includ-
ed allies in the Lords. The government also exercised control over
some constituencies which elected members loyal to the king or his
ministers. Nevertheless, there were too many diverse groups and gen-
uinely independent members in the Commons for any one group to
sustain a secure majority.
The extent of the king’s power depended on the relative power of
the leading parties in Parliament. Whenever the parties remained
divided, the king was able to exercise greater latitude in his choice of
ministers, but when the king’s ministers provoked united opposition
among the parties, a majority in either the Lords or Commons could
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force a change in government. Sometimes the union of the leading
parties was strong enough to compel the king to appoint their leaders
as ministers. Ministers who forced the king to appoint them against
his will, however, did not usually last long in power, as they proved
unable to sustain their parliamentary majorities without the king’s
support.
Securing the necessary majority in both houses of Parliament was
not an easy task for any prime minister. As there was no formal party
system during the late eighteenth century, the making of a parliamen-
tary majority required a combination of diverse parliamentary ele-
ments. If it was clear that the king had confidence in the prime minis-
ter, the latter could count on the support of a certain group known as
“the king’s friends” who would back any government that the king
approved. The next ingredient was a group known as placemen, who
held offices, pensions, and other financial grants at the discretion of
the prime minister. Cabinet ministers, too, brought the votes of their
loyal supporters. Thus it was important that the cabinet include some
of the great landowners who controlled or influenced the elections of
M.P.s. Upon this foundation, the prime minister would add the sup-
port gained through electoral patronage: the Treasury controlled a
small number of seats and could ensure the election of members who
would support the government.
All these votes, however, were still insufficient to guarantee a work-
ing majority. There remained a large number of members who were
independent of party and liable to change their votes depending on
circumstance. The support of these independent members could be
volatile and, on any particular issue, liable to be swayed by the quality
of the debate. The prime minister and the senior members of the cab-
inet had to be able, during the course of debate, to persuade inde-
pendent members to support government policy. Therefore, it was
particularly important that the cabinet include effective parliamen-
tary speakers. Finally, the ministers had to ensure that their support-
ers attended debates and voted with them. Each of these components
was necessary to sustain a parliamentary majority. The prime minis-
ter could never take for granted the confidence of the king or the sup-
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port of Parliament, because he could lose either of them suddenly
over a clash of personality or a change in government policy. This
meant that a change of government could occur almost at any time.
The most influential politician between  and  was King
George III. He had studied the role of the monarch in British politics
as a boy and committed himself to certain political principles before
he became king. He felt that the king should retain the right to choose
his ministers and veto legislation. Devoted to the Church of England,
he had a strong sense of Christian morality. He disliked corruption,
both in politics and in private life. It was his view that, during the
course of the eighteenth century, a small group of corrupt politicians
had attained a level of political power that enabled them to infringe
on the right of the king to appoint his choice of ministers. George III
was determined to reassert what he considered to be his constitution-
al rights and to withstand those politicians who had tried to usurp
the powers of the Crown. A frugal man, he tried to set an example
with his own personal behavior, and he disapproved of the dissolute
lifestyle of many members of the aristocracy and the licentious activi-
ties of his two eldest sons.4
When George III ascended the throne in , he almost immedi-
ately came into conflict with a group of politicians, known informally
as the Whigs, who had, over the course of the previous fifty years,
become accustomed to holding office. Representing the wealthiest
and most powerful landowners, they came to regard themselves as the
natural governors of the kingdom. As a result, there was considerable
turnover in political office during the early years of the king’s reign,
while he and the Whigs struggled for ascendancy. During the course
of this struggle, there developed a particularly acute antipathy
between the king and a young man named Charles James Fox, who
was to become the leader of the Whig party in the House of Com-
mons. The clash between the king and Fox was as much a result of
personalities as of politics. Fox was the son of Henry Fox, an M.P.
who had amassed a fortune and considerable political power through
corruption in political office during the reign of George II. He mar-
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ried into the aristocracy and was granted the title Baron Holland for
his political services. Charles Fox, both charming and a brilliant ora-
tor, was extremely popular and inspired a fierce loyalty among his
personal friends and political allies. Nevertheless, he followed a liber-
tine lifestyle of excessive eating, drinking, and gambling, which the
king abhorred. Fox became a close friend of the Prince of Wales, and
the king blamed him for corrupting his son. Fox, in return, resented
the king and openly criticized what he perceived to be the growing
influence of the Crown in British politics.
In , Fox and the Whigs built a parliamentary alliance that
enabled them to force the resignation of the king’s ministers and
establish themselves as the only candidates for office who could com-
mand a majority in both houses of Parliament. The king was unable
to find any alternative candidates who were willing to take office, and
had no choice but to appoint Fox and his allies. They took office with
William Cavendish-Bentinck, the third duke of Portland, who was
one of the most powerful landowners and whose family had been
leading members of the Whig party for most of the eighteenth centu-
ry, as prime minister and Fox secretary of state for foreign affairs.
Fox’s triumph was, however, only temporary. The king became
increasingly resentful of Fox and determined to dismiss him, Port-
land, and the rest of the government at the earliest opportunity.
Although Fox and his allies had sufficient parliamentary support to
govern, many independent M.P.s felt that Fox had crossed the bounds
of acceptable parliamentary conduct in forcing the king to appoint
him. Governing was a partnership between the king and the houses of
Parliament. While it was unacceptable for the king to appoint minis-
ters Parliament opposed, it was equally inappropriate for Parliament
to compel the king to appoint ministers whom he detested. The king
could not dismiss Fox and Portland, however, until he found replace-
ments for them.
This conflict between the king and Fox launched the remarkable
career of William Pitt, the Younger, who was to dominate British pol-
itics from his appointment as prime minister in  until long after
his death in . Pitt was the second son of William Pitt, the first earl
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of Chatham, who had been a popular politician and a successful war
leader during the Seven Years War against France (–). Chatham
was a political outsider whose political power derived from his skill at
parliamentary debate rather than from his social connections. He
educated and trained his son at an early age to become a great public
speaker, so that William would also be a successful politician. The
younger Pitt exceeded his father’s high expectations. He became the
most effective speaker ever to debate in the House of Commons, at a
time when speaking ability was the most important quality a politi-
cian could possess. Pitt often spoke for hours, late into the night,
impromptu without notes, and yet every word seemed meticulously
selected. His timing was remarkable. He placed precise emphasis on
every word to give it maximum effect, as if the whole production had
been extensively rehearsed.
Although he was only twenty-four years old and had only a few
month’s previous experience in cabinet office as chancellor of the
Exchequer, he appeared to have the skills and abilities necessary to
form a government strong enough to survive the opposition of Fox
and Portland. After the king dismissed Fox and Portland and appoint-
ed Pitt in December , the new prime minister faced a daunting
task. Fox and his allies retained a majority in both houses of Parlia-
ment. Pitt persevered in the face of this parliamentary opposition and
over the course of a few months won the support of enough members
of Parliament to establish a majority. The M.P.s who supported Pitt
were not all politically attached to him, but as long as Fox was the only
alternative, they preferred Pitt. Pitt called an election in the spring of
 in which many new government supporters were elected and a
number of Whigs were defeated. This victory was as much a triumph
for the king as it was for Pitt, because the electorate identified Pitt as
the king’s choice, reinforcing the king’s position that he had the
authority to appoint his own ministers. This triumph for the govern-
ment also spawned a great personal rivalry between Fox and Pitt.
From that moment forward, Fox proclaimed himself “the champion
of the people” because he opposed what he considered to be the
increasing power that the king was exerting over the people’s repre-
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sentatives in Parliament. Fox accused Pitt of being merely an agent of
the king. Fox’s loyal following in Parliament was strong enough to
ensure that Pitt had to manage Parliament carefully to retain his
majority and that the king remained dependent on Pitt to keep Fox
out of office. This polarized both houses of Parliament, because a sol-
id minority in each house felt that the king had acted contrary to the
Constitution when he dismissed the Whigs and appointed Pitt. Pitt
and Fox were the only possible candidates for office, and the antipa-
thy that existed between them and between their supporters made
remote any possibility of their serving together in office.
Pitt remained in office until . During the s, he was able to
sustain a majority on votes of confidence, but he was not able to pass
all legislation he introduced. The French Revolution of  and the
war that followed in  made managing Parliament even more chal-
lenging. The French Revolution acted as a catalyst to a popular move-
ment for parliamentary reform in Great Britain: the French attempts
to construct a new system of government upon principles of reason
provided a contrast to the British electoral system, in which only a
small, privileged portion of the male population could vote and the
franchise qualifications varied greatly between constituencies. Some
regions of the country were over-represented and others under-rep-
resented. Many radical political observers believed that more men
should have the right to vote and that a reform of Parliament would
lead to better government. The French Revolution and the radical
movement in Great Britain also precipitated a conservative reaction.
Conservatives believed that any measures of parliamentary reform in
Great Britain ran the risk of devolving into the violence and anarchy
that occurred in France as a result of the Revolution. The issues that
the French Revolution sparked ultimately split the Whig opposition.
Fox and a small group of radical Whigs continued to support the par-
liamentary reform movement in Great Britain even though most of
the great landowners in the party led by Portland came to oppose it.
Pitt was able to reinforce his parliamentary majority by forming a
coalition with Portland and the conservative Whigs in , leaving
Fox alone in opposition with a smaller but staunchly loyal band of
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supporters. The coalition gave the government so much strength that,
in , Fox despaired of his situation and ceased to attend Parlia-
ment. This left Pitt’s parliamentary position virtually unassailable at
the time, but that did not mean he was invulnerable over the long
term. The challenges of fighting the war with France and the domes-
tic crises that it provoked eventually created the circumstances that
compelled him to resign in .
The most important issue in British politics during the final
decade of the eighteenth and into the nineteenth century was the war
with France. The war lasted from  until  with two brief inter-
ludes in – and –. Great Britain and France had fought a
series of wars throughout the eighteenth century over conflicting
strategic interests. Both were commercial maritime states competing
for markets in Europe and control of trade overseas. They developed
colonial empires in close proximity in North America, the Caribbean,
and India. They competed for maritime trade in the North Sea and
the Mediterranean and built large navies for commercial and military
purposes. Spain and Holland also had commercial empires, but by
the end of the eighteenth century Great Britain and France possessed
the two strongest.
The most important region of strategic interest for Great Britain
was the Low Countries, comprising modern Belgium and the Nether-
lands, which contained the best harbors on the Channel coast for
both commercial and military purposes. The ports were key trade
links between Europe and the outside world. Antwerp had the poten-
tial to rival London as the main commercial center in Western
Europe. For this reason, Great Britain had arranged through interna-
tional treaty with the Great Powers of Europe for the closure to all
naval traffic of the Scheldt River, which linked Antwerp with Central
Europe. It was vital to Great Britain’s interests that France not control
this region. As France did not have good harbors on the Channel
coast, the harbors of the Low Countries would improve the ability of
the French navy to attack Great Britain. Control of the commercial
centers in the region also would have enabled France to sever impor-
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tant British trade links with Europe. France was interested in obtain-
ing this territory not only for its commercial and strategic value, but
also because the southern portion of this region was inhabited by
French-speaking people. During the eighteenth century, an impor-
tant principle of French foreign policy was to expand the territory of
France until it encompassed its “natural boundaries.”
When the French Revolution began in , Great Britain was sat-
isfied with the international status quo. The territorial settlements
that had resulted from the previous wars with France had conformed
with British strategic interests. French politics during the early years
of the Revolution concentrated on internal affairs to the extent that
France became largely inactive in international politics. The Revolu-
tion itself was not originally a significant concern for other states.
Some observers in Great Britain believed that the French were
attempting to establish a constitutional monarchy in imitation of the
British model. It was in these circumstances that Pitt told the House
of Commons in  that Europe had never had a better prospect of
fifteen years of peace.
Anglo-French relations changed almost immediately after Pitt
uttered those words. The French were soon at war with Austria and
Prussia. Although the eastern monarchies had initial success in battle,
the French drove their invading armies out of France, across Belgium,
and over the Rhine. France then annexed the territories that the Aus-
trian and Prussian troops had evacuated. Shortly thereafter the
French opened the Scheldt River to navigation. The opening of the
Scheldt and French annexation of parts of Belgium made war with
Great Britain almost inevitable. The French then made an appeal of
fraternity to the oppressed people of Europe, calling on them to
throw off their oppressors. As this was also directed at Great Britain, it
made the resolution of differences between the two states even more
improbable. In the end, the French government declared war on
Great Britain shortly after beheading Louis XVI in early .
Pitt attempted to fight France the way his father had during the
Seven Years War, by paying allies to divert French forces on the Conti-
nent and deploying the Royal Navy to attack French trade and
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colonies overseas. Pitt’s strategy was successful in the maritime and
colonial sphere. The British captured French colonies in India and the
Caribbean, and the British navy won a series of naval battles in the
Channel and the Mediterranean which greatly decreased the strength
of the French navy. Pitt’s European strategy, however, failed miser-
ably. French forces drove out the small army he sent to Belgium. He
made loans to the Austrians and granted subsidies to the Prussians to
fight the French, but these allies eventually withdrew from the war
without driving the French from the Low Countries. The French
army, swelled by the ranks of conscripted soldiers, fought with a revo-
lutionary zeal against European armies, comprised largely of merce-
naries, who did not have the same vested interest in the outcome of
the war. By , France had annexed parts of Belgium, Germany, and
northern Italy. Austria and Prussia made peace with France. Spain
and Holland, which had begun the war allied to the British, changed
sides and joined the French.
Great Britain’s other main strategic interest was the Mediterranean
Sea. The British had valuable trading interests in the region, but its
overriding strategic importance was illustrated by Napoleon Bona-
parte’s expedition to Egypt in . The French occupation of Egypt,
if it were followed by an invasion of Syria, threatened to give France
control of the overland routes to India. A permanent French base
could also threaten British trade in the Eastern seas. If the French
opened a new trade route between Europe and the East through the
Red Sea-Suez region (with a projected travel time between France
and India of eleven weeks, half the time required for British trade
around the Cape of Good Hope), such competition would under-
mine Great Britain’s commercial monopoly in the region.5 It was for
this reason that, in the autumn of , Pitt’s administration sent a
costly expedition to Egypt to dislodge or neutralize the French pres-
ence, so that the French army would be removed as part of a compre-
hensive peace settlement.6
Bonaparte’s expedition to Egypt also highlighted the significance
of Malta, which was the most important strategic post in the Mediter-
ranean. Bonaparte had captured Malta as a base for his invasion of
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Egypt. In so doing, he demonstrated that the Knights of St. John, an
international Catholic military order that for centuries had been
responsible for protecting the neutrality of the island, could no longer
defend Malta. In , the British invaded Malta, defeated the French,
and retained a British garrison on the island. The security of British
naval interests in the Mediterranean and imperial interests in India
required that Malta be secure from French control. British possession
of Malta, however, threatened French interests in the Mediterranean.
There was also a Russian angle to this issue, as Tsar Paul I, the hon-
orary grand master of the Knights of St. John, wanted the island to be
restored to them, free of either French or British control. Therefore,
British policy on Malta had an important impact on both Anglo-
French and Anglo-Russian relations.
Bonaparte’s invasions of Malta and Egypt helped Pitt forge a Sec-
ond Coalition with Russia and Austria, who also opposed French
interference in the Ottoman Empire, to which Egypt belonged. The
new coalition experienced initial success during the campaign season
of , when Russian and Austrian forces drove the French back
through Switzerland and Italy and an Anglo-Russian expedition
invaded Holland. The failure of the allies to coordinate strategy or
devise compatible war aims, however, weakened the alliance and
allowed the French to regain the initiative. The Anglo-Russian forces
withdrew from Holland and the French army drove the Russians and
Austrians back across Switzerland and northern Italy. By the end of
, the Russians had withdrawn from the war and the French had
defeated the Austrians decisively in Italy and Austria.
Some British historians of the period have argued that this repre-
sented a stalemate between the predominant sea and land powers
with neither being able seriously to threaten the other. These assess-
ments fail to appreciate the desperate nature of Great Britain’s strate-
gic position.7 French control of Western and Southern Europe posed
a considerably greater threat to British interests than British com-
mand of the sea did to French. The British economy was more
dependent on international trade than was the French, and Great
Britain’s most important markets were in Europe. French control of
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the Mediterranean and Channel ports almost completely severed
important British trade links with Europe. Closer to home, the
French were in better position to invade Great Britain than the British
were to invade France. Far from having fought France to a stalemate,
Great Britain was at a considerable disadvantage.
Great Britain’s naval policies had also provoked the enmity of oth-
er states. The Royal Navy frequently boarded neutral ships in interna-
tional waters to seize contraband of war destined for France. Den-
mark and Sweden tried to take over French trade that had been
disrupted by the British blockade of French ports, and the Danes and
Swedes became extremely annoyed with British interference. They
turned to the tsar for protection.8 The result was that Russia, Den-
mark, Sweden, and Prussia signed the convention of the League of
Armed Neutrality in –. The convention had two important
results. First, the League denied the British access to Baltic trade in
grain and naval stores—masts, tar, pitch, and hemp—which were
vital to the Royal Navy. This caused the price of grain in Great Britain
to rise and led to severe shortages in some areas. Second, Great
Britain was virtually in a state of war against all of Europe, and the
Royal Navy had to face the combined naval strength of France and the
northern powers.9
The Anglo-French War between  and  illustrated several
important points about the capacity of Great Britain to wage a Conti-
nental war. The British had not won a European war without the
assistance of Great Power allies since the triumph of Henry V over the
French at Agincourt in . Geography and manpower worked
against them. Great Britain was primarily a naval and commercial
power on the periphery of Europe and lacked a permanent base on
the Continent. Its population was considerably smaller than that of
France, Austria, or Russia. This, combined with a political culture
characterized by a strong aversion to standing armies, rendered the
British unable to compete with the larger armies of the other Great
Powers. The result was that the British alone could not defeat the
French in battle. The North Sea and the English Channel acted as a
defensive barrier for the British, but hampered their ability to put
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troops into the Continental battlefields. Even the largest British fleet
was not capable of delivering a sufficient number of troops into a
decisive battle. The Royal Navy could gain command of the seas, but
this was insufficient to force the French to retreat from regions of
vital British interest. The best the British could achieve on their own
was to capture overseas colonies, win celebrated naval battles, and
establish naval blockades.
Assertions that Great Britain was the strongest power in the world
and recent historical analyses of the foundations of British power
obscure an essential point about the nature of that power.10 Power is
relative: relative to other states, relative to particular fields of interest
or geographic locations. State power is significant only to the extent
that it can preserve the fundamental interests of that state. Despite
having the strongest navy, the most extensive colonial empire, and the
greatest commercial and financial wealth in the world, Great Britain’s
most essential economic and strategic interests lay in Western
Europe, where on its own it could not defend those interests against
Revolutionary and Napoleonic France. Great Britain may have been
the most powerful state in the world, but it could not exercise that
power effectively where it mattered most. The other Great Powers
knew that Europe was the only theater of war that really mattered.
That is why they considered the British contribution to the allied war
effort to be of secondary importance.
In order to defeat the French, the British required the assistance of
allies with larger military resources and the ability to put them into
the field effectively. The Russians, Austrians, and Prussians were not,
however, always prepared to fight at the prompting of the British or
for British strategic interests. Pitt used British gold to entice Conti-
nental allies to fight for British interests, but did not succeed. The
Russians, Austrians, and Prussians would fight the French only when
it was in their interests and they were militarily and financially pre-
pared. The British were at the mercy of developments on the Conti-
nent, over which they had little control. By early , Continental
politics had left the British in a dangerous situation indeed.11
The French Revolutionary Wars of – were complicated by
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factors of ideology and nationalism. The wars were fought primarily
for strategic interests, but the ideological differences between the
French Republic and the monarchies of Europe intensified the exist-
ing antagonism. The French feared that defeat in war would lead to a
restoration of the monarchy, while European monarchies feared that
defeat would lead to their overthrow and replacement by republics.
From the British point of view, Pitt never claimed that the restoration
of the French monarchy was one of Great Britain’s war aims, and he
did not stipulate that he would not negotiate with the Republic, but
he doubted whether any peace settlement could remain secure until
there was political stability in France. He also adopted a policy of
assisting French counter-revolutionary forces against the Republic,
which made the French government distrustful of him, rendering a
peace settlement even more difficult. The king and some members of
the British cabinet did believe, however, that the restoration of the
French monarchy should be one of Great Britain’s war aims, and they
opposed negotiating with French republicans.
There was also a national animosity between the British and the
French. The sense of British national identity that emerged during the
eighteenth century was centered largely on antipathy to France.12 As
Great Britain was a culturally and ethnically diverse island, the people
derived a sense of unity not from characteristics common to its inhab-
itants but from their distinctiveness from the rest of the world.13 In
this way, the British distinguished themselves from France, their great-
est commercial, military, and cultural rival.14 Popular patriotic soci-
eties, such as the Anti-Gallican Association formed in , were estab-
lished to combat French cultural influence in Great Britain by
promoting British commerce, manufacturing, and indigenous artistic
achievement, while denigrating French fashions, food, and literature.15
This general antipathy toward France carried over into politics.
The British identity defined itself in terms of Protestantism and par-
liamentary government, in contrast to the Catholicism and arbitrary
monarchy of eighteenth-century France and to the atheism and
republicanism of Revolutionary France. It was common for both rad-
icals and conservatives to tar their political enemies as dupes of the
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French. The series of wars fought between Great Britain and France
over the course of the eighteenth century also created the impression
that the two states were natural enemies, reminiscent of rivals Rome
and Carthage. These nationalist ideas and emotions supported pro-
ponents of an anti-French foreign policy, and often fettered the gov-
ernment when British diplomatic interests required an accommoda-
tion with France. Foreign policy initiatives that appeared to be
pro-French were considered unpatriotic. These feelings ran so strong
during times of war that some Englishmen supported fighting France
to the end and opposed peace terms that were in any way favorable to
France.16 This made Anglo-French treaties of peace even more diffi-
cult to negotiate.
Pitt’s inability to win the war or negotiate peace created military
and diplomatic crises, and precipitated a serious social crisis that fur-
ther hampered the government’s ability to fight the war. Great Britain
experienced a general war weariness that verged on violent dissatis-
faction, as the rich were pinched by high levels of taxation and the
poor by the high price of grain.17 The crops of  and  were
deficient owing to poor weather. Between January  and March
 the price of wheat tripled. As bread was the staple diet of many
people, hunger became widespread and resulted in an unprecedented
series of massive food riots across Great Britain.18 Demanding a fair
price for bread, large groups of the poor intimidated bakers, corn fac-
tors, and farmers. Workers and the unemployed attacked rural farm-
ers who inflated their prices.19 Protest against high prices often
merged with protest against the war, as many blamed the war for
price inflation.20 There was truth in this assumption, as the war pre-
vented the importing of adequate food supplies from the Continent.21
The British could obtain no grain from France, and Great Britain’s
dispute with the League of Armed Neutrality cut Baltic supplies of
grain, which had provided more than  percent of British imports.22
The poor and the lower classes were not the only ones affected: the
grain crisis also precipitated a drastic and widespread economic
recession that caused the domestic market for British commodities to
collapse, coinciding with the loss of major European markets for
16 Introduction
British goods.23 While the war provided certain economic benefits
(such as stimulating demand for shipbuilding, armaments, and cloth-
ing for the armed forces), and new colonial conquests provided
sources of raw materials, the war also created large numbers of
unemployed who were displaced from traditional industries. At the
local level, this caused industrial and commercial decline. The middle
and upper classes, already losing revenue because their tenants
defaulted on their rents, at the same time had to pay higher prices for
goods and higher taxes to finance the war, while making larger contri-
butions to poor relief in order to prevent a severe famine.24
The government was in serious financial difficulty. By , Great
Britain was importing more than it was exporting and the value of
the pound had dropped against European currencies.25 Government
borrowing to finance the war also restricted short-term credit avail-
able to commerce and industry and drove up long-term interest
rates.26 Many industrialists and financiers believed that Great Britain
required peace, and the stock market noticeably fluctuated in relation
to the prospects for peace.27
These dire social and economic conditions gave members of the
British establishment grounds to fear social revolution. While high
grain prices and food riots had occurred often in the past without
causing serious alarm, the revolutionary context of the s provid-
ed an added dimension to the danger posed by the social unrest. The
example of the French Revolution and the publication of radical
pamphlets gave an ideological impetus to protest against the existing
system of government. A working-class political movement arose in
support of parliamentary reform. When this political protest began to
use language that verged on sedition, Pitt responded by curbing the
activities of radicals through legislation, and in  their leaders were
arrested for treason. In , sailors in the Thames and Channel fleets
mutinied over poor pay and living conditions. The greatest threat to
British security, however, was the Irish Rebellion of . Ireland, with
its predominantly Catholic population, posed a strategic liability to
Great Britain whenever it was at war with Catholic states in Europe,
because the island was an excellent base for an invasion of Great
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Britain. British legislation that denied Catholics basic political rights
and the brutal manner in which English absentee landlords treated
their Irish tenants eventually provoked a rebellion by both Catholics
and Protestants. Although British forces quelled the rebellion, British
strategic interests remained insecure. As Irish rebels continued to cor-
respond with the French government, British officials expected that
another rebellion would coincide with a French invasion.
By , ministers and local officials believed that there was an
important connection between food riots and revolutionary insurrec-
tion in England. They feared that although most of the rioters were
only responding to the distress of the moment, a small group of revo-
lutionaries was trying to use scarcity as an excuse to incite general dis-
content.28 The regions where the most serious unrest occurred, such
as Nottingham, Yorkshire, Lancashire, and Norwich, were also the
centers of skilled artisan labor and the focus of the most extensive
activity of the English and Irish revolutionary underground.29 This
mixture of radical ideology, underground organization, unstable
industrial relations, and widespread famine was a recipe for insurrec-
tion.
The British government felt that it had to take serious measures in
the defense of order, but suppressing unrest required armed force.
With crises erupting in every region of the kingdom, there were
insufficient resources to meet the challenge. Ireland had been rela-
tively quiet since the rebellion of , but lingering uncertainty
required a commitment of , regular infantry and , cavalry
to maintain order.30 Diverting troops to quell unrest also tied up a
large number of British troops needed to fight the French. In order to
release more regular troops from the task of suppressing unrest, local
authorities often employed regiments of volunteer soldiers as police
forces. The experience of the food riots of  brought this policy
into question, as volunteers sometimes disobeyed their officers and
joined the rioters. This underlined a frightening and real prospect. In
the event that rioting became widespread, Great Britain’s military
resources might not be able to cope if some of the security forces
refused to fight or joined the insurrection. The governing classes were
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an active minority surrounded by an indifferent multitude, and, dur-
ing a crisis, the government justifiably feared that it might be deserted
by high and low alike.31 This risk increased as the social, commercial,
and military crises persisted. An organized revolutionary movement
did exist, and although social factors mitigated against a social revo-
lution along French lines, these factors worked largely below the sur-
face of events and were not obvious to contemporaries.32 The culmi-
nation of these military, economic, and social crises led to a change in
government in  by which Henry Addington became prime minis-
ter of Great Britain.
Addington was the first prime minister who was not related either
by blood or by marriage to the formal aristocracy. The Addingtons
were gentry who had owned land in Oxfordshire since the fourteenth
century. By the time Henry Addington took office in , he owned
land in Berkshire, Wiltshire, and Devon. Addington’s father, Anthony,
came to be renowned as a physician. While Addington’s political
antagonists exploited his father’s profession in order to label him as
“middle class” and thus unsuited to the office of prime minister, it
should be noted that Dr. Addington was not an ordinary physician.
He had been educated at Winchester and Trinity College, Oxford. He
had money from land and the opportunity to pursue the more ortho-
dox career paths for members of his social background, but the expe-
rience of a near fatal illness while at Oxford sparked a keen interest in
medicine. Dr. Addington specialized in mental illness, a field in which
little work had been done, and one that had become particularly fash-
ionable and revered. Consequently, it granted him entry to the aris-
tocracy. In , he moved to London and eventually became an
important member of the Royal College of Physicians. Dr. Addington
became celebrated among the great houses of London as an expert on
mental illness, having successfully treated William Pitt, the Elder. He
was also one of the physicians consulted about the king’s illness dur-
ing the Regency Crisis of –. Among the most illustrious mem-
bers of his profession, he made enough of a fortune from his work to
purchase the valuable estate of Upottery in Devon. Nevertheless,
members of the aristocracy and their allies would later tar Henry
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Addington with the pejorative nickname “the Doctor,” on account of
his father’s profession.
Henry Addington was born in a house on Bedford Row near
Gray’s Inn and Lincoln’s Inn in London on  May . From a
young age, Addington was social by nature and had a strong desire to
be liked, which he retained throughout his life. Unable to develop
close relationships with his parents (who sent him to boarding school
at Cheam in Surrey when he was only five years old), he built strong
relationships with his brother and sisters and acquired a large circle of
close friends, many of whom would eventually become his political
supporters. He made new friends when he went to Winchester School
in  and later at Oxford after . He was a successful student but
he did not allow his studies to prevent him from enjoying a social life.
He played sports during his early years and spent evenings drinking
with friends when he was at Oxford.
Addington demonstrated intelligence in school, attaining high
marks in classes with boys several years his senior. One of his teachers
at Cheam referred to him as a “genius.” At Winchester, he became the
favorite student of a junior assistant, who inspired in Addington a
lifelong devotion to the Protestant religion, characterized by regular
church attendance and a strict sense of personal ethics that he would
retain for the rest of his life. A fellow at Brasenose College, which had
a reputation for serious study, Addington so loved his academic and
social life at Oxford that he stayed on for an extra year after he fin-
ished his degree. He demonstrated his intellectual abilities in ,
when he won the chancellor’s prize for the best English essay for a
work entitled “The Affinity between Painting and Poetry in Point of
Composition.”33 The essay attested to his scholarship and his interest
in art and poetry. He loved English and French literature, and would
later become a great admirer of the poetry of Robert Burns. He also
wrote poetry himself. The best example of his skill in this sphere is a
clever metaphorical verse that he wrote one evening at Pitt’s home
during the Regency Crisis. Addington took a line from the famous
eighteenth-century poet Alexander Pope’s translation of The Iliad
“So Shines the Moon pale regent of the Night” as the theme for a
verse in heroic couplets (in imitation of Pope’s style) about how sup-
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porters of the king viewed the prospect of a regency under the Prince
of Wales.34
After Addington left Oxford he trained as a barrister at Lincoln’s
Inn in , but his personal life interfered with his training. He fell
deeply in love with Ursula Mary Hammond, and married her in 
 despite the objections of his father. This was significant in that
Addington had little money of his own, and Ursula did not have a
large dowry. Addington remained devoted and faithful to Ursula for
thirty years, and she was a strong support to both his personal and
political life. They had seven children upon whom they doted. Ad-
dington became so attached to his children that he would interrupt
public business to be with them whenever they were seriously ill.
Addington demonstrated early on that his family and friends were
more important than to him than politics, and in this he never
changed.
The most significant friendship that he developed as a boy was
with Pitt. Addington met him when Dr. Addington began to treat Pitt
the Elder in . Addington was two years older than the shy and
reserved young Pitt. Despite the social distinction between their
fathers, Addington felt no sense of inferiority toward him. Addington
and Pitt met again in  at Lincoln’s Inn, where Addington became
one of Pitt’s closest friends. Their friendship grew steadily during the
early s, even after Addington had settled with his wife in
Southampton Street and Pitt had entered the House of Commons.
Although Addington did not have a seat in Parliament, his friends
assumed that his connection to Pitt would lead eventually to his
involvement in politics. In early , when Pitt was briefly chancellor
of the Exchequer, Addington’s friend and future brother-in-law
Charles Bragge wrote, “When I left town, I thought the first post
would bring me an account of your being called to the service of your
country in some honourable station, under the auspices of your illus-
trious friend.”35 This proved premature, as Pitt was soon out of office.
Addington met with Pitt after he became prime minister in December
, but Bragge was again disappointed when Addington did not
receive a government office.
Addington was one of the many supporters of Pitt elected to the
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House of Commons in . His entry into Parliament was facilitated
by James Manner Sutton, who had married Addington’s sister Eleanor
in . Sutton had been M.P. for the borough of Devizes in Wiltshire,
which had less than forty voters, and he exercised some influence with
them. When Pitt called the election in March , Sutton chose to
withdraw from the contest and recommend Addington in his place.
Although a number of other candidates took an interest in contesting
the seat, all but one withdrew by the time of the vote, and Addington
and the other were elected by acclamation. Addington was returned
unanimously in , , and , serving as the member for
Devizes until his elevation to the House of Lords in .
In his first few years at Westminster, Addington suffered from a
lack of ambition and lack of confidence in his speaking ability, char-
acteristics that would continue to hamper his political career. They
kept him from taking a visible role in Parliament, even though Pitt
persistently encouraged him to speak in the Commons. This did not
mean that Addington was idle. He spent time learning about the his-
tory and traditions of Parliament. Although he made no speeches, he
studied thoroughly the important political issues of the day. Adding-
ton was keenly interested in naval affairs and read extensively on the
history and theories of taxation. He also took part in some adminis-
trative work. Eventually, Pitt decided to force Addington to overcome
his reluctance to speak, and selected him to second the address in the
House of Commons upon the opening of Parliament in . Pitt
wrote, “I will not disguise that in asking this favour of you, I look
beyond the immediate object of the first day’s debate from a persua-
sion that whatever induces you to take a part in public, will equally
contribute to your personal credit and that of the system to which I
have the pleasure of thinking you are so warmly attached.”36 Pitt
believed that his friend had the potential to be an effective M.P. and
an able administrator, if he could only overcome his personal insecu-
rities and develop a greater sense of ambition.37
The House received Addington’s maiden speech favorably, but it
was not enough to encourage him to overcome his reluctance to
speak again for the remainder of the session. He did not make his sec-
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ond speech until May , when he spoke on an issue of taxation.
Although it was on a subject in which he was particularly interested,
he remained typically self-effacing as to his performance. His sister
Charlotte, in describing the speech to their father, stated that Adding-
ton “acquitted himself so entirely to the expectation of his most san-
guine friends, that they now are convinced he can never again feel
more than a becoming embarrassment on a similar occasion.”38
Pitt’s faith in Addington’s abilities did not waver and he remained
determined that his friend should take a more active role in Parlia-
ment. In , the right opportunity presented itself. The office of
Speaker of the House of Commons became vacant when Pitt appoint-
ed the incumbent, his cousin, William Wyndham Grenville (later Lord
Grenville), to the cabinet post of home secretary. Grenville’s brief five-
month tenure as Speaker had not been popular and Pitt saw the
advantages of appointing someone he thought could restore the
respect of the House.39 Addington’s knowledge, skills, and personality
made him uniquely suited to this role. He had read extensively on the
history and traditions of Parliament, and knew and understood the
rules and practices of parliamentary procedure as well as anyone.
From a technical perspective, his grasp of duties and responsibilities
of the Speaker were unparalleled. Addington also possessed a remark-
able breadth of mind. He had a rare ability to understand and sympa-
thize with both sides of every issue. This did not mean that he was
indecisive, for he made many difficult decisions throughout his career.
He understood and respected differing points of view, and could see
shades of gray where others saw only black and white.
Addington was also a natural diplomat. He was conciliatory and
had the ability to put people at ease when speaking with them about
political issues. Sylvester Douglas, Lord Glenbervie, a politician and
diarist who often dined with Addington, described his manner of
handling people:
He is a man of considerable address as well natural as acquired, much
frankness of manner, but tempered with a sufficiency of reserve; will-
ing enough to speak freely of men, as well as of political transactions
and political questions, but that only when he has ascertained what
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your opinion is. Not that he is insincere or weak enough to square his
own to yours, but if he can he will colour and shade it in to yours if
you seem to him to differ from him only in some reconcileable [sic]
degree.40
The desire to be liked that he exhibited in his childhood was also
apparent in his political career. He knew how to get on the right side
of people. In contrast to Pitt, whose cold and austere personality
annoyed many backbenchers, Addington treated them with courtesy
and respect. In fact, Pitt often needed to employ Addington to
smooth personal relations between him and other M.P.s.41
Addington was also congenial enough to win the friendship and
goodwill of many of those who might be thought his political oppo-
nents. Treating everyone with cordiality and respect made him uni-
versally liked, even among people who disagreed with his policies,
beliefs, or actions. He was the only politician to have been, at different
times, the favorite of both George III and George IV. The latter came
to like and trust Addington more than the rest of the cabinet, includ-
ing the prime minister, and insisted that he remain in the cabinet
after his resignation of the Home Office in . Although one of the
closest friends of Pitt, Addington was also seen walking arm in arm
with Fox. He was friends with two other leaders of the Whig party, the
great conservative orator and philosopher Edmund Burke (for whom
he served as pallbearer) and the playwright Richard Sheridan. Both
Burke and Sheridan had been bitter enemies of Pitt. The most power-
ful woman within the Whig party—who was also a devoted follower
of Fox—Georgiana, duchess of Devonshire, admitted that, despite
her political differences with Addington, she liked him personally.42
Those who opposed him politically acknowledged that no one could
question his honesty.43
Although Addington was a close friend of Pitt, opposition mem-
bers sensed an air of independence about him that set him apart from
Pitt’s young disciples, whom they held in contempt. Upon Adding-
ton’s election as Speaker, Sheridan apologized for voting against him
for reasons of party, though Addington was about as popular with all
parties in the House of Commons as it was possible to be.44 Adding-
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ton rewarded their confidence by managing the business of the House
with impartiality and a strong sense of fairness. Throughout his
career as Speaker, he never lost the confidence of the House, and
members of both the government and the opposition praised his
conduct.
Addington developed a particularly close rapport with the ordi-
nary, backbench county members. Many of the squires felt a social
affinity with him that they did not feel with the leading members of
the government and the opposition. They admired his attachment to
principle, his even temper, and the respectful manner with which he
treated people.45 While they acknowledged the speaking abilities of
Pitt and Fox, some M.P.s found Addington’s simple and direct man-
ner more reassuring.46 Addington also developed a reputation for
integrity, through his refusal to accept the types of honors and finan-
cial perks that many other politicians grasped at. He turned down the
sinecures that were traditionally offered to the Speaker, even though
the office did not provide remuneration sufficient for him to meet
ceremonial and social duties expected of the office. He also demon-
strated his impartiality by entertaining both the government and
opposition. He invited government members of the House to dine on
the first Saturday of every session, and opposition members the first
Sunday, with similar functions throughout the year.
By , Addington had served successfully as Speaker for twelve
years and was not interested in higher office. He would have been sat-
isfied to continue as Speaker indefinitely. Members on both sides of
the House liked and respected him to an extent that would have been
impossible had he been in a cabinet office. He had achieved all that he
had desired from a political career. Political power held no attraction
for him. It would take compelling circumstances to convince him to
trade the comforts of the Speakership for the onerous duties of gov-
ernment.
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